Candidates face a trade-off in the general election between taking a moremoderate position that appeals to swing voters and a more-extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's base. The threat of abstention by voters in the party's base if their candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to take more-extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this trade-off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and Senate members for the period . I then present data on how the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric polarization in Congress in recent decades.
During the middle of the twentieth century, centrist politics dominated Congress to the point that a committee of prominent political scientists dedicated a full report to proposing reforms to encourage the parties to take clear distinctive partisan stances (American Political Science Association 1950) . The committee got its wish: the two political parties in Congress diverged from each other over the next several decades. An important feature of the increase in polarization since the early 1970s is that it has been driven largely by the movement of the Republicans in the conservative direction. Figure 1 plots the DW-NOMINATE scores 1 of the party medians for the two parties from the 92d Congress (1973-74) to the 108th Congress (2003-04) for the House and Senate. Hacker and Pierson (2005) have argued that the increasing conservatism among Republican politicians is elite driven and occurred in spite of voter preferences (see also Frank 2004) . The purpose of my study was to determine if there could also be a voter-based explanation for this observed asymmetric polarization. To be clear, I did not directly test Hacker and Pierson's claim. Rather I explored what a voter-based explanation for this asymmetric polarization might look like and then tested the plausibility of that explanation. In other words, I tested for any evidence that at least part of the asymmetric polarization has been voter driven.
To articulate a voter-based explanation, I revisited the literature on candidate positioning, which, although extensive (see reviews in Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005 , Fiorina 1999 , and Grofman 2004 , has ignored the importance of turnout (Fiorina 1999, 3, 28) , especially variation in turnout of the parties' bases. At the same time, political commentators have put increased importance on variation in participation as an explanation for candidate positioning. 2 I describe a theoretical framework that incorporates the conventional wisdom, assuming that the more-extreme members of a candidate's base will abstain when their candidate is too moderate. I will discuss some of the possible observable implications and my tests of these implications using data on the characteristics of district voters and the position (determined by roll-call votes) of the 2000 House election winners.
A key assumption in my study is that a candidate's position in the election translates, at least partly, into the candidate's roll-call voting Democrats Republicans Incumbents' Roll-Call Voting behavior in Congress. This is an important point, because, although the theoretical framework concerns candidate positioning, I chose to test the hypotheses using incumbents' roll-call votes. There are two theoretical reasons for making this assumption. First, if incumbents do not keep their campaign promises, then they can be held accountable in the next election (as, for example, George H.W. Bush was in 1992). Second, I am interested in whether or not the effect of elections can explain the patterns of polarization in Congress, which can be ascertained by looking at Congress members' voting records. If elections affect campaign promises but not voting records, then elections cannot be the driving force behind any change in polarization.
In the sections that follow, I introduce the theoretical argument and provide analysis for the predictions using data for House members and their constituents in the 107th Congress and data on senators and their constituents for the period . I also present data regarding changes in the distribution of voters in the electorate over the past three decades, and I discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these distribution changes might explain the observed asymmetric polarization in Congress.
The Swing-Base Trade-Off
The basic intuition for the argument that I make is that candidates face a trade-off in the general election: they may take a moremoderate position that appeals to swing voters or a more-extreme position that appeals to voters in their party base. Voters in the party's base force their candidate to take a more-extreme position by threatening to abstain if the candidate opts for a position too moderate for these voters' taste. 3 How much a candidate moves in the extreme direction depends, at least in part, on the size of the base relative to the proportion of swing voters in the district. In particular, as the size of the candidate's base becomes larger (or the number of swing voters becomes smaller), the candidate should take a more-extreme position. Increases in the size of the opposition's base should also moderate the candidate's position.
Before I discuss the intuition for these predictions in more depth, I describe the assumptions that I am making. First, I assume two candidates-a Republican and a Democrat-with full information who are simultaneously choosing their ideological positions in order to maximize their own probability of winning the election. Second, I assume that there are three types of voters: the Democratic base, the Republican base, and swing voters. I assume swing voters behave as classic Downsian voters (Downs 1957) , voting for the candidate closest to them in ideological distance. The Democratic and Republican base voters are assumed to vote, if they vote, for the candidate of their party. This assumption reflects one of the most important and consistent findings from survey research on voting: party identification has a strong effect on vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960) . Jessee (2009) has provided evidence that these simplifying assumptions about the decision-making processes of swing and base voters are reasonable. Using original survey data, Jessee showed that independents behave like classic Downsian voters, choosing the candidate closest to them in ideological distance, while partisan voters exhibit strong bias toward the candidate of their party.
Candidates' positions do not affect the base voters' candidate preferences, but I assume that voters in the base abstain when their candidate takes a position that is too moderate for them. Thus, the base voters do not choose between the Republican and Democratic candidates, but between voting for their own party's candidate and staying home. If their party's candidate takes a position that is too moderate for them, then the more-extreme members of the base will choose to stay home. This assumption about the base voters' turnout behavior is key to the predictions that I test, because it is the threat of abstention by the candidate's base that motivates a candidate to take a more-extreme position. Studies by Plane and Gershtenson (2004) and Adams, Dow, and Merrill (2006) support this assumption: the farther away voters are, ideologically, from either of the two candidates, the more likely voters are to abstain from voting. 4 Finally, I assume that voters' types are exogenous, which implies that candidates' positions do not affect to which group a voter belongs and that voters do not change types during an election. Since I am only interested in behavior that occurs during an election, this assumption does not preclude the possibility of voters using cues from the political candidates to sort themselves into parties or changing ideology between elections (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Levendusky 2009 ; for a related argument, see McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) . In fact, these two mechanisms could work together: as candidates take more-distinct positions, the voters sort into parties; this sorting causes the bases to move farther apart for the next election, which in turn drives the candidates to take new positions during the next election that are even farther away from the median. The crucial point here is that during the few months covered by an election, voters are not significantly changing ideology or party identification as the result of candidate actions (Campbell et al. 1960) .
Given these assumptions, we would expect candidates to face a trade-off between mobilizing their base and attracting swing voters. By moving toward the center, a candidate attracts more swing voters but loses more base voters, who will not turn out to vote because the candidate's position is too moderate. Symmetrically, if a candidate moves toward the base, then base voters turn out in higher numbers but the candidate loses ground with swing voters.
The positions of candidates facing this trade-off should be affected by the size of the different voting blocs: the larger a bloc of voters, the closer the candidate should position himself or herself toward that bloc. When the swing voters constitute a larger proportion of the electorate, the candidate should take a more-moderate position, because as the number of swing voters becomes larger, the returns from choosing that position are greater. If, however, the size of a party's base gets larger, then the candidate should take a more-extreme position, since the increased size means that there are more base voters to be mobilized.
If we take the assumptions literally, then swing voters should have more leverage than base voters on a candidate's position. This asymmetry arises because base voters can only subtract votes, whereas swing voters can transfer votes from one candidate to the other. The candidate must turn out two base voters to make up for every swing voter who switches to the other side. Ultimately I cannot test this prediction, for reasons I will later explain, but some of my results are consistent with this possibility.
In addition to the swing voters and the candidate's own base, the opposition's base presents a third bloc of voters that should affect the candidate's position. A complete examination of the strategic interactions between incumbent and opponent positions exceeds the scope of this project, but the interactions nevertheless play an important role in our understanding of how the opposition's base might affect a candidate's position. In particular, as the opposition's base grows, the opposition candidate should move to a more-extreme position, making it easier for the incumbent to woo swing voters in the middle and pulling that candidate toward the center. Thus, the larger the opposition's base, the more moderate the candidate's ideological position should be. Table 1 summarizes the predictions for how the size of the different voting blocs should affect candidate positioning.
If these predictions are correct, then we need to understand how voters are distributed if we wish to understand representation. Most often, researchers assume that they can capture voters' preferences in a district simply by using the two-party presidential vote share (for instance, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001) . The predictions in Table 1 suggest that, in addition to there being a Democrat and Republican split within a district, roll-call voting positions are determined by the proportion of swing voters in the electorate. Legislators are responding to more than the mean position of the voters in the district. When testing the predictions listed in Table 1 , I could only test the predictions jointly. To explain why, I use the following definitions: y i = the extremity of candidate i's position; γ Bi = the proportion of voters in i's district who are part of candidate i's base; γ Si = the proportion of voters in i's district who are swing voters; γ Oi = the proportion of voters in i's district who are part of the opposition's base; and C = all other variables for the model.
Ideally I would like to estimate the following equation:
If I could estimate equation (1), then I could use the parameters β γB , β γS , and β γO to test the predictions in Table 1 for the size of the different voting blocs. But because γ g represents the size of group g, measured by the percentage of the population, and there are only three types of voters, then, by construction, γ Bi + γ Si + γ Oi = 1. This relationship creates a case of perfect multicollinearity; I cannot include all three of these variables and a constant in the same regression to estimate equation (1) . By substituting 1 -γ Si -γ Oi for γ Bi in equation (1), however, I can obtain an estimable equation. (The Appendix explains why I chose to substitute for γ Bi rather than γ Oi or γ Si .) Incumbents' Roll-Call Voting
I rearrange equation (2) to get the following estimable equation:
If I estimate equation (3), then the coefficients on the size of the Swing-Voter Bloc (γ Si ) and the size of the opposition's base (γ Oi ) are both quantities that I can sign based on the predictions in Table 1 . The coefficient on the size of the Swing-Voter Bloc represents the quantity β γS -β γB and should be negative (a negative number minus a positive number is a negative number). Similarly, the coefficient on the size of the opposition's base represents the quantity β γO -β γB and should also be negative.
Incumbents' Roll-Call Extremity in the 107th Congress
I used data on the House members of the 107th Congress (2001-02) and their districts to estimate equation (3) and test the predictions. Again, I used incumbents, because, in order to test whether or not the hypotheses can help explain the increasing levels of polarization in Congress, I needed to look at members' voting records. To measure the extremity of members' voting records, I used Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores. Since I am interested in the general ideological position of each legislator, I only used the score on the first dimension, which is generally interpreted as the liberal-conservative position of the legislator. Since DW-NOMINATE scores are estimated such that 0 represents a midpoint on the ideological scale, with increasing values indicating increasing conservatism, I measured the extremity of the incumbents' roll-call voting by using the original DW-NOMINATE score for Republicans and by flipping the scale for Democrats.
I created the independent variables in the analyses using data from all cross-sectional samples in the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey. One of the great advantages of the Annenberg survey is the large number of respondents interviewed (an average of more than 100 respondents per congressional district). The only districts not represented are those from Hawaii and Alaska, where the survey was not conducted. 5 To operationalize the variables, I tried to identify which voters were in the parties' bases in two ways: (1) by including all party identifiers, both weak and strong, and (2) by including only strong party identifiers. The criteria yielded the same substantive conclusions, but, for the sake of completeness, I present both sets of results.
Independent Variables
I measured Size of Swing-Voter Bloc by dividing the number of respondents who identified themselves as independents by the total number of respondents. In other words, this variable measures the proportion of respondents in the district who self-identify as independents. As I explained at the end of Section 1, I expected the coefficient on this variable to be negative.
I determined Size of Opposition's Base by dividing the number of respondents who identified with the major party opposing the incumbent by the total number of respondents. Thus, this variable measures the proportion of respondents in the district who self-identify with the opposition party. For a Democratic incumbent, this variable therefore denotes the percentage of self-identified Republicans in the district population. Again, I expected the coefficient on this variable to be negative.
Since previous research has recognized the importance of the voters' positions in both the general (Downs 1957) I measured Extremity of Primary Electorate using the selfidentified ideological positions of the respondents who said they had participated in (or planned to participate in, if the primary election had not taken place yet) the primary for the incumbent's party. The original question in the Annenberg survey allowed respondents to identify one of five positions for their self-reported ideology, ranging from very conservative to very liberal. I coded these responses to range from 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative) for people participating in the incumbent's primary when the incumbent was a Republican. I coded the responses to range from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very liberal) for people participating in the incumbent's primary when the incumbent was a Democrat. Thus, in both cases, the increasing values indicate increasing levels of ideological extremism for the given party. I then measured Extremity of Primary Electorate by taking the average value of these scores for individuals who indicated that they would participate in the incumbent's primary. I expected the coefficient for this variable to be positive, indicating that increasing levels of ideological extremity in the candidate's primary electorate are related to increasing extremity in the incumbent's roll-call voting.
I measured Extremity of General Electorate using the same procedure I used to measure Extremity of Primary Electorate, except, in this case, I used the average of the self-identified ideological position of all the respondents in the district. I expected the coefficient for this variable to be positive, indicating that increasing levels of ideological extremity in the candidate's general electorate are related to increasing extremity in the incumbent's roll-call voting.
Regression Results
Using these variables, I estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the hypotheses. The dependent variable in all cases is Extremity of Incumbent's Roll-Call Voting. Table 2 presents the results when a party's base defined as all party identifiers, and Table 3 shows the results when the base is restricted to strong party identifiers. The predicted signs for the coefficients appear alongside the results. As previously noted, the same substantive conclusions are reached with both definitions of the party base, so I will focus on the results in Table 2 .
The first thing to notice is that the coefficients on Size of Opposition's Base and Size of Swing-Voter Bloc always have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. To understand the substantive meaning of these results, recall from equation (3) that the coefficient for Size of Opposition's Base (Size of Swing-Voter Bloc) gives the estimate for the quantity β γO -β γB (β γS -β γB ). This value indicates the change in a House member's roll-call extremity when all voters in the district shift from being in the member's base to being part of the opposition's base (swing voters). So, for example, the estimated -0.19 on Size of Swing-Voter Bloc suggests that if all the voters in a district shifted from being Republican voters to being swing voters, then the Republican incumbent would take a position 0.19 points more moderate. Perhaps a more-realistic counterfactual is to consider the effects we might see if one-third of the district's voters shifted from being in the incumbent's base to being swing voters. In that case, we would expect the incumbent's DW-NOMINATE score to become 0.06 points more moderate. Similarly, a shift that took one-third of the incumbent's base and moved those voters to the opposition's base would make the incumbent's DW-NOMINATE score approximately 0.20 points more moderate. Since the dependent variable is the DW-NOMINATE score of the representative, even shifts of 0.06 points can be substantial. matter. Having more swing voters or opposition-party voters in the district is related to the House member being more moderate, whereas having more base voters is related to the member being more extreme. Note that these results hold true even if one controls for the extremity of the general and primary electorates. In the full regression, the coefficients on both of these variables are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that incumbents are responsive to the positions of the voters in both the primary and general elections. When those voters become more extreme, so does the roll-call record of the incumbent.
Finally, as previously mentioned, I used the National Annenberg Election Study because the large number of survey respondents per congressional district provides more confidence in the accuracy of the measures of the independent variables. There are still likely to be errors associated with the measurement of these variables, however. To assess the likely effects of these types of errors, I performed an errors-invariable analysis, specifying different levels of reliability for the observed values of the independent variables. I assumed that the reliability would be the same across all four of the included independent variables, since all were created using the same survey respondents. I estimated the regression model from the first "coefficient" column of Table 2 , using the following reliability levels: 0.975, 0.95, 0.925, and 0.90. The results appear in Table 4 .
As the level of reliability decreases, the size of the coefficient on Extremity of General Electorate decreases, but the coefficients on the remaining variables, including the two variables for the size of the voting blocs, increase. Further, the coefficients on Size of Opposition's Base and Size of Swing-Voter Bloc continue to be statistically significant at conventional levels, even when the reliability is only at the 0.925 level. At the 0.90 level, Size of Swing-Voter Bloc is no longer statistically significant, but Size of Opposition's Base is still significant (and is the only variable that is significant). The results show that the main findings are robust to reasonable amounts of error in how the independent variables are measured.
Senators' Roll-Call Extremity, 1982-2004
To further test the predictions listed in Table 1 , I used data from the major news organizations' general-election-day exit polls for the 1982-2004 period to measure the distribution of voters for that period. Again, the independent variables were measured using individuals' self-reported party identification and ideology. In the exit polls, these variables were measured on a three-point scale. Using these data, I repeated the procedure from the previous analysis to measure Size of Opposition's Base, Size of Swing-Voter Bloc, and Extremity of General Electorate. I did not measure Extremity of Primary Electorate because I only used data from the general-election exit polls. For the dependent variable, I used the same procedure, determining Extremity of Incumbents' Roll-Call Voting by using the original DW-NOMINATE score for Republicans and by flipping the scale for Democrats, so that in both cases an increase in value indicates an increase in extremism.
The difference between the analysis in this section and the previous section is that I exploited the fact that I have multiple observations of the same senator over time to estimate a between-effects model. I used a between-effects model instead of the more commonly used fixedeffects model because DW-NOMINATE scores are produced by assuming that changes in legislators' scores occur in a linear fashion over time. Because the DW-NOMINATE scores are smoothed over time, they do not accurately capture the changes between two specific periods, which is the variation used to identify fixed-effects models. The average DW-NOMINATE score for an individual over a long period should, however, accurately capture that person's true average voting ideology during that period. What the between-effects model does is regress that average value of the dependent variable for an individual-the extremity of the DW-NOMINATE score in this case- on the average of the independent variables for the same time period. The model is thus identified by only using the variation that occurs between the individuals (and not the variation that occurs within individuals over time).
For the between-effects model, I had a total of 1,089 observations representing 224 individual senators. The results of the regression appear in Table 5 . Size of Opposition's Base and Size of Swing-Voter Bloc have the correct sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels. Further, although the coefficient on Size of Opposition's Base is about two-thirds the size of the corresponding coefficient in Table 2 , the size of the coefficient on Size of Swing-Voter Bloc is about three times larger. These results represent substantively important shifts in the ideological extremity of legislators' roll-call voting.
Ideally we would like to know the coefficients on the size of the three different groups individually. As I explained in Section 1, however, the regressions cannot identify these underlying coefficients, only test the joint hypotheses. The only way to get estimates of these coefficients is to make assumptions beyond the regression model. One reasonable set of assumptions to make is that all of the coefficients have the correct theoretical sign and that the size of the two smallest coefficients are equal in magnitude. If we make those assumptions, then the results in Table 5 suggest that β γB ≈ 0.2 and β γo ≈ -0.2 (since β γO -β γB ≈ -0.4) and that β γs ≈ -0.4 (since β γS -β γB ≈ -0.6 and β γB ≈ 0.2). If these are in fact the true estimates, then they would be consistent with the more-detailed predictions of the model, which suggest that incumbents should be twice as responsive to swing voters as they are to other voters (see discussion in Section 1). That said, there are at least two reasons why extreme caution should be used regarding any conclusions about the underlying coefficients. First, the results from the previous section would lead to different conclusions. And second, any such conclusions depend on making untestable assumptions. Of course, even without being able to identify these underlying coefficients, these results are important because they still provide strong evidence for the theoretical framework. The sizes of the different voting blocs matter for legislators' roll-call voting behavior, even if we are unsure how much each of the three voting blocs matters individually.
Understanding the Asymmetric Congressional Polarization:
The Changing Electorate
One of the motivations for this research is to better understand the polarization of parties in the U.S. Congress over the past several decades. As Figure 1 suggests, there has been an increase in the polarization between the parties that has been driven largely by the Republicans' movement in the conservative direction. Can the results in this article help explain this trend? Figure 2 shows the change in the distribution of party identifiers and independents over the same period, with reference to the party of the House incumbent. The data used to create Figure 2 come from the National Election Study (NES) surveys for the years 1974 to 2004. Significantly, the number of Democratic party identifiers in districts represented by Democratic legislators appears to have decreased slightly over this period, while the number of Republican party identifiers in districts represented by Republicans has increased about 10 percentage points. 7 One of the more important findings from the previous two sections is that an incumbent's roll-call voting responds to the sizes of the different voting blocs in the district: increases in the proportion of independents and the size of the opposition's base are related to increasing moderation; increases in the size of the incumbent's base correspond to increasing extremism. These findings suggest that a decrease in the number of Democratic identifiers for Democratic incumbents and an increase in the number of Republican party identifiers for Republican incumbents should cause the Republicans to become more extreme and the Democrats to become more moderate. This logic would predict the asymmetric polarization driven by the Republican Party that we in fact observe.
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Of course, the observed pattern has not been that Democratic legislators have become more moderate, but rather that they have not moved in the extreme direction as much as the Republicans. A potential explanation for this trend comes from the other result in Table 2 : increasing extremity of the incumbent's primary electorate is related to an increasingly extreme roll-call voting record for the incumbent. Although the NES does not track who the primary-election voters are, I can estimate how the primary electorates have changed over time by looking at the changes in the ideology of the party identifiers who make up the majority of primary voters. If the empirical results here are causal, then the shifts in the position of the primary electorates (as measured by changes among party identifiers) would have caused the Republican and Democratic incumbents to have more-extreme positions. For Republican incumbents, this effect would have been magnified by the increasing size of the Republican base, causing the Republican incumbents to assume even more-extreme voting records. For Democrats, the two changes in the party base would have worked in opposite directions. The movement of the base to the left would have given the Democratic candidates incentives to move left, but the decreasing size of the base would have worked in the opposite direction, giving Democratic candidates more incentives to appeal to swing voters by moving right. We would therefore predict the Democrats to move less than the Republicans, which is the trend that the data show (Figure 1 ).
Discussion
This research was motivated by a desire to see if there could be a voter-based explanation for the observed asymmetric polarization in Congress over the past several decades. The results suggest that changes in the parties' bases may be the reason for the increased polarization. If the relationships identified in this article represent causal effects, then the fact that voters in both parties' bases have taken more-extreme ideological positions has caused the candidates to move their positions farther from the center. For Republican candidates, this effect has been reinforced by the increasing size of the party base, which pushes the Republican candidates to take even more-extreme positions. For Democratic candidates, the polarizing pull of the base's movement to the left has been weakened by the decreasing size of the base. These results imply that congressional incumbents still respond to the preferences of their constituencies, a suggestion that contradicts claims that the increasing conservatism of Republicans is purely elite driven (see, for example, Frank 2004 and Hacker and Pierson 2005) . Although parties may not be responding to the position of the median voter, they are still responding to the preferences of their constituents.
Besides providing a potential explanation for why the parties in Congress have diverged from one another and the median voter (especially the Republican Party), these results are important because they suggest that a party's base can have a polarizing effect on the candidates in the general election, not only in the primary election, as has been hypothesized (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004, ch. 8; see also Burden 2004) . That is not to say that primary elections are not polarizing. The evidence here suggests that they are. But the general election is not necessarily a moderating force. From the empirical results here, we can extrapolate that even without primary elections, we would have polarized parties, because candidates take more-extreme positions to try to appeal to their bases in the general election. Primary elections are likely a cause of the increasing polarization, but they are not the sole cause of it.
Redistricting is one of the other culprits sometimes identified as the source of increasing polarization in Congress. The findings here suggest that the effects of redistricting should not be homogeneous but should depend significantly on how the districts are drawn. Recent empirical studies have shown that simply changing the district boundaries will not necessarily lead to polarization (Carson et al. 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008) . Of course, a contingent effect does not mean that redistricting is unimportant or that we could not increase ideological moderation by changing how redistricting is conducted. To evaluate those claims, however, future work should examine how redistricting changes the distribution of voters.
More generally, the results of this article indicate that, when possible, we should move beyond using the two-party presidential vote to measure district preferences, at least when investigating issues of representation. Legislators do seem to respond to the mean ideological position of voters in their districts, which is something that the twoparty presidential vote share can capture, but the results here suggest that legislators are also responsive to the distribution of voters in their districts. In particular, roll-call voting positions are determined both by the Democrat-Republican split within a district and the proportion of swing or independent voters. These findings prompt several other questions for future research. First, are the relationships uncovered in this article causal in nature? Although the results are consistent with the idea that House members are responsive to the position and size of their voter bases, I have not shown that there is a causal relationship. It is possible that some other mechanism is at work. For example, voters may use cues from the political candidates to sort themselves into parties or to change their ideologies between elections (Levendusky 2009 ; for a related argument, see McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) . Perhaps one of the most important tasks for future work is to develop research designs that enable us to identify the causal effects of candidate positioning. Such designs should test not only the effects of the size and position of the parties' bases but also other factors that have been proposed in the literature on candidate positioning.
Second, does compulsory voting make candidates and campaigns more moderate? In a system with compulsory voting, the increased cost to abstention should cause more voters to turn out, which should make mobilization of base voters less of a priority for candidates, thereby causing candidates to move their positions toward the center to attract swing voters. The effect of compulsory voting on the moderation of candidates and campaigns is an important, albeit underresearched, topic (Jackman 2001) . Once addressed, it may show a way to shape our electoral institutions to achieve a less-polarized polity. 
Daniel

APPENDIX
To arrive at equation (3), I substituted for γ Bi in equation (1) . This decision was not random. I could substitute instead for either γ Si (γ Si = 1 -γ Bi -γ Oi ) or γ Oi (γ Oi = 1 -γ Bi -γ Si ) in equation (1) . Such substitutions would lead to equations (4) and (5) 
Between equations (3) and (5), I can recover estimates for the following six quantities: β γB -β γO , β γB -β γS , β γS -β γO , β γS -β γB , β γO -β γS , and β γO -β γB . Notice that each of these quantities represents the difference between two of the three regression coefficients. While there are six quantities, there are only three unique pairs. For each pair of regression coefficients, there are two quantities for which one quantity is simply the absolute value of the other. That is, -(β γS -β γB ) = β γB -β γS ; -(β γO -β γB ) = β γB -β γO ; -(β γS -β γO ) = β γO -β γS .
Of the three possible pairs, equation (3) recovers two of them (β γS -β γB and β γO -β γB ).The third pair, comparing β γS and β γO , is not recovered by equation (3), although it can be recovered by equations (4) and (5) . The theory makes no prediction about what the difference between these variables should be, since both are predicted to have a negative sign and it is ambiguous what a negative number minus a negative number should equal. Since equation (3) exhaustively tests the hypotheses for which I have predictions, I chose to present only the results for equation (3) .
